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RIGHTS MovEMENT AND
AFFIRMATIVE AcTION?
By Frederic White*
The bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 undoubtedly was one
of the most tumultuous events of the 20th century. It set the stage for four
years of global warfare that resulted in the wholesale disintegration of nations
and families, tremendous loss oflife, and worldwide economic upheaval. One
of the obvious challenges of what eventually became known as World War II
was the U.S. government's need to design and construct the weapons of warfare, as well as produce the material to fuel those weapons. Some areas of the
country were more suited than others to provide these kinds of services. Richmond, California was such a place.
The City of Richmond, located in the East Bay, north of Berkeley and northeast across the San Francisco bay from the city of San Francisco, already possessed twelve major shipyards, including Henry Kaiser's massive ship building
facilities, as well as numerous oil refineries, at least two of the necessary ingredients
for the successful waging of a fighting campaign. 1 Richmond, however, lacked

* Dean and Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law.
1. Marilynn S. Johnson, Wartime Shipyards: The Transformation of Labor in San Francisco's East Bay, in AMERICAN LABOR IN THE ERA OF WoRLD WAR II, 89 (Sally M. Miller &
Daniel A. Cornford eds., 1995) (hereinafter "Johnson").

59

6o

HARBINGER OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?

one important ingredient: enough labor to build the ships and work in the oil
refineries. What to do?
Excerpts from one book discussing the World War II era details the events
of the day, revealing how, because of the war, the old world had become new
for black workers lured to Richmond:
Between 1942 and 1945, slightly more than 50,000 black people moved
to the East Bay, fulfilling a utopian dream .... War industries, which
dominated the landscape for those years, created an unprecedented
demand for labor and seemed to promise a share of the California
dream to every able-bodied worker who could make the journey.
Thousands of blacks set out to claim what California offered. In doing
so, they transformed the basic premises on which the prewar black
community had existed in the East Bay. Their sheer numbers suddenly made black people highly visible in public places and gave them
a dynamic presence which could not be ignored ...
The labor recruiters who traveled to Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and the Carolinas were looking for workers for Kaiser's four
gigantic shipyards in Richmond, for Marinship in Sausalito, for Moore
in Oakland and Todd in San Francisco. The rapid growth of war industries in the Bay Area and the enormous mobilization of men [and
women] into the Armed Forces demanded many more workers than
the region could provide ...
In the poverty-stricken Dustbowl states and in the rural South, the
promise of industrial jobs in the West appeared as a ticket out of an
endless cycle of despair, and Federal recruiters were only one part of
the network that carried the message. Blacks already in the East Bay
wrote letters to relatives; whole church congregations heard from one
or two members about the opportunities. In these informal communication networks, the successes of those who had already gone were
emphasized and stories were told about a society where blacks were much
freerer than in the South. Recruiters urged men to come without their
families to work "for the duration" of the war emergency.... Believing
that freedom from southern restrictions would liberate their own resourcefulness, they had no intention of relinquishing the opportunities the war placed before them .... 2

2. Crouchett, Bunch and Winnacker, "Visions toward tomorrow: the history of the East
Bay Afro-American community," 1852- 1977 (Northern California Center for Afro-American
History and Life) ( 1989), pp. 45-46 (hereafter, "Visions"); see also, Johnson, pp 90-91.
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In keeping with the old saying, "be careful what you wish for:' some southern blacks, recruited to the "promised land" of northern California in search
of a brighter future full of new jobs and broader freedoms, soon learned that
the harsh reality of their lives in the West was far less than the expected dream. 3
Cleophus Brown, an African American from the south who traveled to the Bay
Area in search of work during the war, provides this account:
Arriving in Richmond in 1942, Cleophus Brown got off the train and
walked a block to a cafe. He was refused service. Neither Franklin D.
Roosevelt Executive Order 8802 of June, 1941, forbidding racial discrimination in all defense contracts nor the desperate need for labor
created equal opportunity. 4
Thus, all was not as promised. Despite assurances that things would be different, black workers who had been arriving by the trainload-sometimes as
many as six full trains a day5 -soon found out that Jim Crow was alive and well
in the Golden State. In many cases black workers were routinely shut out of higher
paying, relatively safe jobs and relegated to the more dangerous ones and for
less pay.6 Further, they were still the last to be hired and the first to be fired.
After arriving with such hope, blacks found more and more doors shut to them
at the docks and in the refineries, even hiring in grocery stores. Unions engaged in discriminatory practices. Landlords refused to ret;~t. Restaurants,
shops, and theaters began to segregate or refuse service altogether/ One author
observed:
The integration of blacks, women, and other newcomers was indeed
a sensitive issue among white workers .... Although blacks and whites

3. Opposed to job discrimination in industries, in 1941 long-time black activist A. Philip
Randolph threatened to stage a massive demonstration in Washington, D.C. to protest such
practices. As a result of Randolph's threat, President Roosevelt created the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). See Brown, et al., White-Washing Race: The Myth of
a Color-Blind Society, p. 164 (University of California Press, 2003).
4. See "Visions," supra note 1 at 46.
5. Clifford Metz, "A City in Transition: Richmond during World War n:• an interview
conducted with Judith K. Dunning (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, 1992).
6. "Seeing them as well-suited to arduous labor, shipyard employers concentrated black
workers in the hull trades-hard, outdoor work on a year-round basis. By contrast, Chinese-American workers were often placed in electrical work, a lighter, detail-oriented trade
considered more suitable for them." Johnson at p. 92. Johnson notes that cultural stereotypes were not immutable and did change somewhat based on the labor demands dictated
by the war effort.
7. See ''Visions:' supra note 1 at 46.
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worked side by side, racial tensions were all-pervasive. "The slightest
touch ... revealed the impermanence of the surface calm and the depth
of the hatred beneath." The hostility ... was most evident among white
Southerners and was often couched in gender terms invoking the threat
of miscegenation. s
Out of this background arose the case of Hughes v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 9 decided by the California Supreme Court in 1948.
As a response to the discriminatory hiring practices of a large number of
white-owned businesses in the 1940s, Hughes and others established a group
called "Progressive Citizens of America" ("Progressive") in Richmond, California. The Hughes case detailed the events surrounding unemployed black
workers picketing certain "Lucky Stores;' a grocery chain with a store located
near the Canal Housing Project in Richmond, in order to compel the store to
hire more black clerks. In response to the picketing, lawyers for Lucky Stores
requested a preliminary injunction against the picketing. The request for injunctive relief was granted by the Superior Court of Contra Costa County. The
injunction, challenged by Hughes' attorneys as a Due Process Clause violation,
was annulled by the intermediate appellate court, 10 but reinstated on review
by the Supreme Court of California.u Nevertheless, despite the reinstatement
of the preliminary injunction, the picketing continued. Thereafter, Lucky Stores
protested these actions and the picketers were adjudged in contempt of court.
They appealed via certiorari to the California Supreme Court, seeking annulment of the judgment of contempt. In a 4-2 decision, the court affirmed the
judgment of contempt. Justice Jesse W. Carter, Golden Gate Law class of 1913,
wrote one of the two dissents.l 2 Hughes' application for a rehearing was denied.13 Hughes applied for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, but the judgment of the California Supreme Court was affirmed. I"
Although some of the Hughes facts were in dispute, it appears that Hughes
and another petitioner met with some Lucky Stores officials ( 1) to protest some
store employees' treatment of a black man named Jackson who had been accused of shoplifting, and (2) to request that Lucky Stores gradually hire black
8. See Johnson, supra note 1 at 93.
9. Hughes v. Super. Ct. of Contra Costa County, 32 Cal. 2d. 850 (1948).
10. Hughes v. Superior Court in and for Contra Costa County, 186 P. 2d 756 (Cal. App.
Dist. 1, 1947).
11. Id.
12. Justice Roger Traynor wrote the other dissent.
13. Justices Carter and Traynor also voted for a rehearing.
14. Hughes v. Super. Ct. of Cal. in and for County of Contra Costa, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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clerks until the proportion of black to white clerks approximated the store's
proportion of black to white customers. At the time of the controversy, about
50% of the Lucky Stores Canal store customers were black. 1s Lucky Stores indicated that Hughes had requested that it discharge white employees and replace them with black employees. Hughes denied this allegation.
Justice Carter wrote, in part:

DISSENT
CARTER, J. I dissent.
As the majority make no attempt to state the facts with particularity,
it seems advisable to do so here. 16 The controversy centered around
a grocery store in Richmond, Contra Costa County, one of a chain
operated by Lucky Stores, Incorporated. Petitioners were adjudged guilty
of contempt in that, in violation of the terms of a preliminary injunction, they admittedly continued to picket the store in question.
They seek by this proceeding in certiorari to have the adjudication
of contempt annulled, charging that their constitutional rights have
been violated. This court has held that certiorari is the appropriate
method to test the jurisdiction of the superior court where it is challenged on constitutional grounds [Citations omitted]. Lucky Stores
sought an injunction in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County,
naming petitioners and various organizations and individuals as defendants. In its verified complaint that alleged that it was a party to
a collective bargaining contract under a certain clerks' union where
it had agreed to employ only members of the union unless the union
could not meet its demands, or unless the unemployed members of
the union were not satisfactory to it, in which event it might employ
nonunion members, but that such nonunion employees must then join
the union within a specified time. It was further alleged that these
petitioners and other defendants demanded that Lucky Stores agree
to hire Negro clerks in such proportion as the Negro customers bore
to the white customers who patronized the store, and that plaintiff
(Lucky Stores) discharge those employees who had participated in
the apprehension and arrest of one Jackson who had been accused

15. Id. at 719.
16. Here one wonders whether Justice Carter is accusing his fellow justices of stupidity,
duplicity, or both.
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of shoplifting. Lucky Stores alleged these demands were refused because to comply with them would violate the contract existing between it and the union, and that no labor dispute exists between it
and the union, and that as a result of its refusal to comply, the petitioners and other defendants have picketed its store. It is contended
that this picketing will cause irreparable injury, that it is an infringement on plaintiff's right to do business, and would require it
to violate its contract with the union.
In response to the order to show cause w~y a preliminary injunction should not issue, petitioner Hughes filed a counter-affidavit in
the injunction proceeding in which he sets forth the following facts
[Hughes and others had met to protest the treatment of Jackson, to
request that Lucky Stores gradually hire black clerks to approximate
the number of black customers and that they did request the discharge
of any store employees]Y
Carter's dissent then described the picketing as peaceful and non-violent.1s
According to Carter, "The sole question involved, at the present time, therefore, is the right of petitioners to picket a retail store, thereby setting forth
their grievances and demands and publicizing the same." 19
Lucky Stores contended that the picketing was for the "attainment of an unlawful objective" 20 that would violate the company's agreement with the Retail
Clerks' Union. Justice Carter countered that argument with a number of United
States Supreme Court cases holding that "picketing is identified with the freedom
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 2 ' Further, he indicated that the California Supreme Court already had
held that "the right to picket peacefully and truthfully is one of labor's lawful
means of advertising its grievances to the public:'22 Further, he noted that "Labor,
always in a less advantageous bargaining position, has been held privileged to picket
in an endeavor to put before the public its position, needs and desires." 23
17. See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 858-59 (Carter, J., dissenting).
18. The possibility of violence arising from picketing was clearly on the minds of the justices when Hughes was decided. One author's account of the violent post-World War II indicates that was a tremendous amount of labor unrest during that time. See Lannon at
104-11.
19. See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 860 (Carter, J., dissenting).
20. [d.
21. [d.
22. ld. at 861.
23. Id.
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The majority in Hughes held the case of ]ames v. Marinship Corp. 24 was controlling. Marinship involved a dispute against the Marinship Corp., a Sausalito-based employer who had a closed shop agreement 25 with a labor union that
would not admit black people to its membership. The question in Marinship
was whether a closed union 26 coupled with a closed shop was a legitimate objective of organized labor. The court held in the negative, noting that a union
could not maintain a closed shop and an arbitrarily closed union at the same
time.
In our opinion, an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union is incompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has, as in this case, attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed shop
agreements and other forms of collective labor action, such a union
occupies a quasi public position similar to that of a public service
business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer
claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or
fraternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members
does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental
right to work for a living.27
Lucky Stores contended that Hughes and his supporters were illegally picketing for the purpose of setting up a closed shop and a closed union, contrary
to the mandates of Marinship. In essence, Lucky Stores argued that if the company acceded to the picketers' demands, they would be forced to hire employees
on the basis of race.
Carter disagreed. In his dissent, he noted that the Retail Clerks' Union was
not a closed union, thus distinguishing it from the closed union discussed in
Marinship. Further, he noted that the "Petitioners are asking that Negro clerks
be hired, and they are quite willing, and would consider their demands fully
met if the unemployed qualified Negro clerks, presently members of the union

24. ]ames v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721 (1944).
25. A "closed shop" is one that only employs union members. Irving v. ]oint Dist. Council, U.B of Carpenters, 180 F. 896 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
26. A "closed union" is one which arbitrarily denies admittance to qualified workers.
See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 864-65. The wave of newcomers to Richmond, blacks included,
led shipyard and other unions to close their ranks, often barring newcomers altogether, or
a hierarchy of"auxiliary unions." See Johnson, supra note 3 at 93-102; see also, Albert Lannon, "Fight or be slaves: the history of the Oakland-East Bay labor movement:' UNIVERSITY
PRESS OF AMERICA, 2000, 94-96 (hereinafter, "Lannon").
27. See]ames v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d at 731.

'
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involved, were hired. The statement in the majority opinion that the right to

work for Lucky Stores would be based on race, rather than qualification for the work;
is absolutely without foundation. Nothing could be more remote from the truth:'2B
Carter concluded that "the situation presented here does not fall within the
rule announced in the Marinship case. It does not fall within the definitions of
either a closed shop, or a closed union. It must be remembered that picketing
for either a closed shop or a closed union is not forbidden by law, but that the
combination of the two is considered unlawful."29
Lastly, Carter took the position that
the end result of the majority decision is to establish a rule which may
be applied to prevent picketing for the purpose of publicizing the fact
that an employer is discriminating against persons because of race or
color in the selection of employees ... if the picketing is truthful and peaceful, it may be resorted to as the exercise of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech or press, and that is all petitioners did in this case.30

Comment
Justice Carter's dissent in Hughes ultimately embodied more than an opinion about the right to picket and the Free Speech implications of such actions.
In truth, the actions taken by Hughes and his friends had been occurring in the
Bay Area and in other parts of California before the beginning of the war.31
Although the Hughes holding was upheld by the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Carter no doubt would have argued that their ruling was due to the
same misapplication of Marinship undertaken by his own California Supreme
Court colleagues in the Hughes case. 32
The peaceful picketing in the 1940s described by Justice Carter in Hughes set
the stage for the expanded use of both violent and non-violent picketing,
protests and demonstrations in the 1960s, the beginning of the modern Civil
Rights Movement. Further, it can be argued that some of the language used in
his dissent could have been inserted into a brief extolling the benefits of modern day affirmative action. For example, Carter wrote in Hughes that:
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 864 (Carter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
ld. at 864-65.
ld. at 866-67.
See ''Visions;' supra note 1.
Justice Traynor's dissent also indicated that the majority had erroneously applied

Marinship. See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 867 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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It must be admitted by every thinking person that Negroes are, and
have been, constantly discriminated against. They are considered by
some as being fit only for the most menial positions. It was even found
necessary for the Legislatures of the various states to pass laws that
they might obtain shelter and food on an equal basis with members
of the white race. The abolition of slavery did not free the Negro from
the chains his color imposes on him. It has been said that Negroes
may obtain equal opportunities with others for employment by organization, public meetings, propaganda, and by personal solicitation. The effectiveness of these methods may well be doubted. Labor,
as a whole, found that the only way it might attain its objectives of
better working conditions, hours and pay was to exert economic pressure on employers. Nothing else is heeded. Is the Negro here to be
denied his only effective means of communicating to the public the facts
in connection with the discrimination against him, and the only effective method by which he may achieve nondiscrimination?
The majority assume, without deciding, that if racial discrimination
exists, picketing in protest of it would not be for an unlawful objective. How can it be said that picketing to attain nondiscrimination is
unlawful? Petitioners are asking equal treatment, that which is guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States, and yet their
objective is called "unlawful."
The end result of the majority decision is to establish a rule which
may be applied to prevent picketing for the purpose of publicizing the
fact that an employer is discriminating against persons because of race
or color in the selection of his employees. Because, if such employer
should employ only one of such race or color in some menial position,
such as janitor or messenger boy, any claim of discrimination, according to the majority view, would be unjustified, and picketing to
prevent discrimination (even though thousands of qualified members
of such race or color were refused employment for that reason) would
be unlawful, and could be restrained by injunction. Thus must be the
effect of the rule announced in the majority opinion. 33
This portion of Carter's dissent clearly recognizes the long history of discrimination against blacks and the philosophy embodied in the majority's opinion that effectively stifled blacks the opportunity to challenge long-held
discriminatory hiring practices. Further, Justice Traynor's dissent, in which he
33. Id. at 866-67.
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endorsed a policy of "proportionate hiring" echoed some of the sentiments
voiced by Justice Carter in his dissent and signaled an approach that would be
used to fuel the proponents of the concept of affirmative action in the years to
follow. 34
Wholesale picketing, together with the bus and business boycotts of the
1950s and 1960s, eventually led to nationwide school integration,35 the support
of affirmative action advanced in President John F. Kennedy's 1963 Executive
Order 10925,36 and the national policy forbidding job discrimination pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,37 Along the way, the opinions expressed by Justice Carter in his Hughes dissent were taken up by many who believed that the road to the American Dream should be opened up for all.
Accordingly, the language contained in United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Weber,3 8
a Title VII case decided by the Supreme Court in 1979, could easily have been
penned by Justice Carter himself:
Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act-the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society-could
not be achieved unless this trend [black unemployment] were reversed.
And Congress recognized that that would not be possible unless blacks
were able to secure jobs "which have a future." As Senator Humphrey
explained to the Senate:
"What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant
if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What good does it do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his modest income? How
can a Negro child be motivated to take full advantage of integrated
education facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where he can use
that education?"

34. "The picketing in this case is directed at persuading Lucky to take action that it may
lawfully take on its own initiative. No law prohibits Lucky from discriminating in favor or
against Negroes. It may legally adopt a policy of proportionate hiring. The picketing confronts
Lucky with the choice of adopting a policy that is not illegal in itself or risking the loss of
patronage that may result from the picketing. Had California adopted a fair employment
practices act that prohibited consideration of the race of applicants for jobs, it might be
said that the demand for proportional hiring would be a demand that Lucky violate the
law. Neither the Legislature nor the people have adopted such a statute, and I find no implication in the majority opinion that its equivalent exists under the common law of this state."
Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 869 (Traynor, }., dissenting) (emphasis added).
35. Brown v. Bd. ofEdu., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
36. Executive Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (March 6, 1961).
37. Title VII, CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, Pub. L. 88-352 (July 2, 1964).
38. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 ( 1979).

HARBINGER OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?

69

"Without a job one cannot afford public convenience and accommodations. Income from employment may be necessary to further a
man's education, or that of his children. If his children have no hope
of getting a good job, what will motivate them to take advantage of educational opportunities?"
These remarks echoed President Kennedy's original message to
Congress upon the introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1963.39
It is well-documented today that there has been a steady nationwide backlash against affirmative action, evidenced by legislation like California's Proposition 209, the efforts of affirmative action opponents Ward Connerly40 and
the Center for Individual Rights, and in United States Supreme Court holdings
such as Richmond v. ].A. Croson Companyn and Adarand Constructors v. Pena. 42
In the balance is the question whether there will be further erosion in the rights
and protections that John Hughes and others fought for during World War II
in Richmond, California. Despite the changing political landscape of the 21st
century, it is doubtful that if he were alive today, Justice Carter would change
his mind about the principled and straightforward views he expressed in Hughes.
George Bernard Shaw once wrote, "all progress depends on the unreasonable man."43 Justice Carter's judicial colleagues may often have thought that
some of the opinions he expressed in dissents were intractable, stubborn and
unreasonable, perhaps all three. Perhaps. But he was right.

39. Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted).
40. "Supporting segregation need not be racist. One can believe in segregation and believe in equality the races." Ward Connerly quoted by Bob Herbert, "Weirder and Weirder,"
NEw YoRK TIMES, December 19, 2002.
41. Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469 (1989).
42. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
43. George Bernard Shaw, "Man and Superman: Maxims for Revolutionists" (1903).

